Inclusion in Asset Building:
Research and Policy Symposium
Asset Based Policies for the Poor:
A Perspective from the Left
Jared Bernstein
2000
Comments

Center for Social Development

Asset Based Policies for the Poor:
A Perspective from the Left
Jared Bernstein
Economic Policy Institute
Washington, DC

September 2000
Comments

Center for Social Development
Washington University
George Warren Brown School of Social Work
Campus Box 1196
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, Missouri 63130
Telephone (314) 935-7433
Fax (314) 935-8661
http://gwbweb.wustl.edu/csd
E-mail csd@gwbmail.wustl.edu

This paper was commissioned for the Inclusion in Asset Building: Research and Policy
Symposium, Center for Social Development, Washington University in St. Louis, September 2123, 2000.
The symposium was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the George Warren Brown School of
Social Work at Washington University. The organizers and editors were Michael Sherraden and
Lisa Morris.
I thank Bethney Gundersen for helpful comments.

Introduction
Advocates of asset building for the poor, such as Michael Sherraden, make a provocative and
compelling case. They argue convincingly that to advocate exclusively for increasing the
consumption opportunities for the poor, and to ignore asset building, is to miss a deeper
understanding of poverty’s causes and cures.
And yet, despite the fact that there is considerable activity in the policy area around asset
building, this theme often gets short shrift in the policy debate regarding the poor. Most popular
discussions about working poverty seem to focus on jobs, wages, and incomes. When most
advocates for low-income families tick off their policy solutions, Individual Development
Accounts (IDA’s), for example, are either unmentioned or an afterthought. Why is that?
In this brief paper, I offer some thoughts on this question, from a left-leaning perspective. The
first thread of the argument points out the primacy of paid employment in the current poverty
debate. Welfare reform in tandem with a tight labor market and surpluses in the Federal budget
provide a unique and timely opportunity to advocate for policies which improve the quality of
jobs in the low-wage labor market, raise after-tax earnings, and subsidize work-related supports.
In this policy climate, asset-based policy has less immediate political currency.
The next section examines two other reasons why asset-based policies too often get short shrift:
the immediacy and magnitude problems. To better understand the immediacy point, I explore
poverty’s determinants through a common decomposition technique, and examine the extent to
which savings plays a determinant role. My sense from this exercise and from the literature is
that most of the poor’s immediate economic problems call for income or consumption-based
solutions. Of course, if the poor had the assets of the better off, many of these immediate
problems wouldn’t develop, which leads to the question of whether IDAs held by the poor can
generate large enough savings to be as transformational as we want them to be.
Finally, I briefly examine the political economy of asset based policies for the poor. These are
highly redistributive policies, and if they are large enough to make a difference, they are likely to
invoke the same government dependency critique that was potently wielded against welfare
benefits. In my view, that is a perfectly fine battle to have. Certainly assets have been
systematically distributed away from African-American families, for example, throughout our
history. But I argue that progressive policy advocates should avoid depending exclusively on
redistribution through the tax system to lift the economic fortunes of the poor. The primary
distribution, or market outcomes, should also be fair game.
The Primacy of Work
The contemporary debate over reducing poverty focuses almost exclusively on work in the
private sector, not on savings or asset formation. This is not a new state of affairs. For the past
few decades two related themes have dominated the debate over poverty policy. In fact, it is
probably fair to say that these two themes have dominated the debates since the English Poor
Laws and the Speenhamland Act. First, there is the issue of whether the able-bodied should be
required to work. Second is the question as to whether government programs to alleviate poverty
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worsen the problem by inculcating dependency and other behaviors viewed unfavorably by the
tax-paying public.
Regarding the first point, at least from the perspective of safety net policy, the debate appears to
have been settled in favor of work. Things were leaning this way when the Family Support Act
was enacted in the late 1980s, but the passage of welfare reform in 1996 sealed the deal: the
solution to poverty for most able-bodied poor persons was determined to be employment, and
this has come to mean employment in the private sector. In former President Clinton’s original
formulation, those who made good faith efforts to find jobs but failed to do so under the time
limits were guaranteed some type of employment, usually “workfare,” where they could work
off their welfare grant through community service. While plans like this exist in some localities,
the thrust has clearly been towards private sector employment.
As is now well known, the poor have responded to both this policy thrust and to the tight labor
market by working more than ever before. In fact, the employment rates of low-income single
mothers have reached historical highs (see, for example, Bernstein, 2000). In our recent release
of State of Working America we show that the share of poor, mother-only families with any
positive hours of work went from 50% in both 1979 and 1989 to 65% in 1998. Their average
annual hours (pooling across the family) went from about 550 in those earlier time periods to 808
in 1998, close to 50% increase.1
Those leaving the welfare rolls have seen their earnings increase along with others in the lowwage sector, but not by much. The “leaver studies” typically find former welfare recipients in
fairly rocky low-wage careers, with intermittent periods of work, hourly wages in the $7/hour
range, and little wage mobility.
I stress these findings not to rehash what is at this point pretty widely accepted by most analysts
but to point out that this is where I think the current policy battle is, and should be, drawn. The
theme among conservatives is that caseloads are down, employment rates are up: end of story.
The counter-theme among progressives is that the goal of welfare reform was not to transform
the welfare poor into the working poor; it was to significantly lift the living standards of former
recipients, and that hasn’t happened.
If Congress wants the poor to move from welfare to work, then they have a responsibility to
ensure that those who are responding to the call can at least leave poverty, and better yet, raise
their incomes to levels suggested by the family budget literature. This work finds that in order to
meet their basic consumption needs, working families need incomes that are closer to twice the
poverty level.2
These facts have led to a policy environment that is more conducive to a set of “make-work-pay”
policies than might have been expected given the general theme of fiscal restraint that has
dominated recent policy debates. For example, a more generous Earned Income Tax Credit and
a higher minimum wage are two work-related policies which may be enacted in the near future.
1

This calculation includes those with zero hours in each time period. Omitting those mother-only families with no
hours in the paid labor market, we find that average annual hours of work went from 1,020 in 1979 to 1,237 in 1998.
2
See, for example, Bernstein et al, 2000.
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Similarly, the expansion of work-supports in the form of subsidies for child care, health care,
transportation, and so on, have political currency right now. Such ideas are correctly and
convincingly cast in the framework noted above: Congress and state legislators have an
obligation to make sure that those playing by the new rules are meeting their consumption needs.
And these policies go beyond helping the poor—they also reach the near-poor.
Of course, poor families also need to meet their needs regarding savings or asset-building, but
this line of argument connects less directly to the current work-centered debate.
This is, admittedly, a narrow and time-sensitive view of the current debate. Those promoting
asset development take the longer view, a view that is consonant with the whole theme of saving
for the future. My only point here is that I sense a significant political opening to push for
policies which 1) smooth the path from welfare to work by subsidizing work supports such as
child care and transportation, 2) raise workers pretax wages and 3) raise post-tax income.
It should be emphasized that work-based policies are by no means the only game in town.
Welfare reform also allows states to establish IDA programs with TANF funds and discount IDA
assets when determining TANF eligibility. There are also pilot programs in over thirty states,
most of which target the working poor. But these programs are smaller and reach many fewer
people than the work-based programs mentioned thus far (e.g., the EITC, the minimum wage,
subsidized work supports). I would also argue that they do not have the same political resonance
in the current debate. I would not, however, argue that they are any less important, and
ultimately represent an important and overlooked aspect of the economic lives of the poor.
The Economic Constraints Facing the Poor: The Immediacy Problem and the Magnitude
Problem
In an earlier life, I was a social worker in East Harlem working with poor, minority families. As
you can imagine, people came to my office with all sorts of problems, but I can’t remember
anyone ever complaining about their lack of assets.
This is not, of course, because they did not need savings. In fact, as the work of Michael
Sherraden and others has emphasized, access to savings could clearly have solved some
problems, such as the abused partner who doesn’t have the resources to move out. Yet for these
economically constrained and highly stressed families, assets were an unthinkable luxury.
To my discredit, I did not think of them either. Myself and my colleagues were simply
firefighters, looking to extinguish the flames of hunger, homelessness, lack of health care, abuse,
etc., before they consumed our clients. Due to the immediacy of the poor’s income constraints
we were—and I suspect most still are—focused exclusively on providing consumption, not
savings, opportunities.
Of course, while front-line social workers and progressive policy wonks may ultimately serve the
same clients, they clearly have different time horizons. But, as many IDA advocates underscore,
most policy analysts continue to focus on consumption, or income-oriented solutions. Certainly
part of the reason for this is our consciousness about the determinants of poverty today.
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It seems axiomatic to assert that the most immediate determinant of poverty is lack of income.
But a recent article on asset building for the poor stated, “For the vast majority of households,
the pathway out of poverty is not through consumption but through saving and accumulation.”3
It is important to clarify this apparent contradiction.
Those for whom this quote resonates would probably argue that only by significantly increasing
their earnings’ capacity can the poor lastingly climb out of poverty. And to do so doesn’t mean a
dollar increase in the minimum wage or a program that, by providing better child care, enables
one to work an extra few hours per week at a $7/hour job. It means being able to finance a
college education, relocating to a better neighborhood, maybe even starting a new enterprise.
Such arguments certainly make sense, but can we learn anything from the literature on poverty’s
determinants to assess the validity of this reasoning?
One way to frame this research is in terms of micro and macro factors. At the micro level, the
most important events associated with lifting families out of poverty tend to be earnings or
transfer gains and family structure changes. At the macro level, the strength of real economic
growth and the distribution of that growth are the key determinants.
A typical analyses of poverty’s determinants take the form of Table 1, from Mishel et al, 2001
(this table decomposes changes in the rate of poverty, but it could easily be applied to levels as
well). Each entry in the table represents the contribution to the change in the family poverty rate
due to the named factor. For example, over the full 29 year period covered by the table,
educational upgrading by family heads lowered poverty by 3.9 percentage points, while “family
structure” (the shift to family types more vulnerable to poverty, such as single-parent families)
added 3.1 points. On the macro side, economic growth lowered poverty by 4.3 points, but
inequality’s growth, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, more than offset this effect.
Perhaps more convincing research on poverty’s determinants comes out of longitudinal studies
which follow families over time.4 These studies also find the family structure changes, such as
marriage or a child leaving home, and earnings gains are most highly associated with poverty
exits.
It is not obvious what one learns from these studies about the lack of assets as a poverty
determinant, but such information is, to some extent, embedded in the results. For example, the
race result in Table 1 is of course driven by the fact that minorities have higher than average
poverty rates and their share of the population has increased over time. But it is not ordained
from above (or below) that minorities should have higher poverty rates than whites. It is, in
large part, a legacy of discrimination, a factor that has clearly had devastating effects on the
ability of minorities to build assets.
Perhaps it is most elucidating to look at the “big ticket items”—the largest entries—in the table,
and evaluate them in terms of assets. On the poverty reducing side, these are the education
levels of family heads, and the overall growth in the economy. Leading to higher poverty are the
growth of income inequality and family structure, or the increase in single-parent families.
3
4
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Boshara et al, pg. 11.
See, for example, OECD, forthcoming.
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Other than education, none of these factors seem directly related to asset building (though, as in
the case of race, connections can be made). Building human capital through education is, of
course, a major goal of such programs, and in this sense, it is clear that the lack of human capital
is an asset that has historically been in terribly short supply among the poor.
Nevertheless, as the table shows, we have made progress on this front. Over the 29-year period
covered by the table, family poverty rates were lower by four percentage points thanks to the
educational upgrading (and thus, higher earnings) of family heads. This is the result of a longterm trend, a huge national investment of hundreds of billions of dollars in building human
capital.
Two points emerge from this analysis. First, from the perspective of immediacy, asset building
cannot quickly put out the flame of poverty and economic despair. That task lies with income
and consumption related policies. Once the flame is extinguished, assets can help ensure it
doesn’t re-ignite.
But second, once we relax the immediacy criterion, the role of asset-building becomes clear. A
low-skilled person with savings can become more highly skilled. An impoverished family with
unstable housing can move to a better home in a better neighborhood, something that appears to
be associated with better outcomes in the longer term.5
These laudable uses of assets raise the magnitude problem, i.e., given their income constraints,
even with generous matches, how likely is it that the poor can save enough for these large
investments? Many advocates of IDAs to whom I have spoken are quite candid about these
limitations. It is common for them to stress that the income constraints facing the poor and the
cap on most IDAs make it unlikely that a poor family will get very far towards meeting the costs
of college education, home ownership, or starting a business. One recent study found that IDAs
were leading to saving in the neighborhood of between $20-$30 monthly, which, with a generous
three-to-one match could lead to $1,000 a year of savings.6 This is by no means trivial, but it is
unlikely to foot the bill for the kinds of investments that can change the economic trajectory of a
poor family. This estimate is also an upper bound. According to another recent study, it is not
even clear if IDAs, as currently implemented, are leading to increased savings, compared to the
savings that would have occurred in the absence of the program.7
Thus, IDA policies will have to become much more generous if they are going to be truly
“transformative.” Yet, if they are reach such magnitudes, will they run afoul of the second
historical theme noted above: inculcating dependency? Will taxpayers support this high level of
redistribution? I turn to these questions in a final section.

5

See Rosenbaum and DeLuca, 2000.
See Center for Social Development, 2001, Executive Summary.[MS and LM: correct me if I’ve got this wrong]
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[MS and LM: As I recall this came from a paper presented by Stegman—can you confirm that I’ve got this right
and give me the citation?]
6

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

5

The Political Economy of Asset Development
As articulated in this volume, there are good socio-political reasons to support asset based
policies for the poor. Pride of ownership, a sense of future opportunity, the ability to accumulate
human capital or to save for a big ticket necessity—all of these are part of middle-class and up
consciousness and lead to a sense of economic security that I suspect is absent for many poor
families.
But there are some important political/economic connections that asset-based policies fail to
make. First, wage-based policies unify the working class in a way that asset-based policies do
not. In fact, it is worth noting that many right-wing advocates support IDAs, because they think
such policies will connect low-income persons with more of an “ownership” consciousness and
less working class solidarity (see Richard Nadler’s piece in this volume). On the other hand, one
of the potential outcomes of welfare reform is the unification of the poor and the broader
working class in a way that previously did not exist. To the extent that poor persons, who
previously had sporadic experience in the labor market, move towards full-time, full-year work,
their political consciousness may converge with persons higher up the wage scale (but still below
the median). They will potentially become more familiar with and concerned about the variety
of economic trends which have negatively affected the working class, from wage inequality to
macro-policy. They are also becoming targets for unions focusing on organizing the low-wage
labor market, such as the Service Employees International Union.
One can imagine a working-class coalition of workers coming off welfare, unionists, immigrants,
living and minimum wage advocates, and other groups of traditionally low-wage workers (such
as minorities). In the current type of political climate, the first call for such a coalition, I suspect,
would be for their “fair share” of economic growth through higher wage rates. That is, their
initial target is likely to be the primary, not the secondary distribution of wages or incomes, the
latter being the target of the asset-based approach.
This raise the important point that asset-based policies for the poor are purely redistributive (the
same can be said for the EITC). Most progressives are, of course, very comfortable with this
aspect of the policy, but my view is that it is a mistake to depend exclusively on redistribution
through the tax system, as opposed to policies like wage mandates or collective bargaining which
redistribute the gains of productivity growth through the primary distribution, or market
outcomes.
Progressive social policy has become too complacent about accepting market outcomes. With
the exception of the minimum wage, which doesn’t get a lot of support from even progressive
policy analysts, today’s strategy might be characterized as “let the market do its thing; we’ll fix it
with the fisc.” This view seems to maintain that if inflation-adjusted low-wages start to fall
again, as they have for most of the past twenty years, we’ll get them to raise the EITC again, or
we’ll push for higher matches in our asset plans.
There are two reasons why this strategy is problematic, at least for the foreseeable future. First,
to consistently push for ever more redistribution risks raising the dependency critique which was
wielded so potently during the welfare reform debate.
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Second, to uncritically accept market outcomes unnecessarily limits both the debate and its
potential outcome. We should reject the neo-classical notion that any intervention in the primary
distribution leads to sub-optimal outcomes. This is not always the case regarding economic
aggregates (GDP, productivity, job growth) and it’s much less so regarding distributional
outcomes. While some interventions could reek havoc—a $15 hour minimum wage would surely
lead to job losses—others can improve living standards of low-wage workers without negatively
affecting market outcomes, or at least affecting them such that the benefits outweigh the costs.
As former labor secretary Ray Marshall likes to say, “Sometimes the free hand is all thumbs.”
Expounding on my current favorites, in terms of policies that affect pretax wages, is beyond the
scope of this paper. The list would include minimum wages, unions, and full employment
policies. But the point here is that asset-based policies which are purely redistributive cannot be
the only part of the puzzle.
Conclusion
Nobody, of course, thinks assets are the only answer to all the poor’s problems. I’m sure most
progressive advocates feel as I do that asset building is one leg of the stool. We should avoid the
either/or trap, one which those of us who focus exclusively on wages, income, and short-term
consumption fall into too often.
Asset-based policies for the poor obviously deserve our attention, focus and support. We should
continue to evaluate them and expand the ones that seem most effective. At the same time we
should recognize their limits. The contemporary policy debate focuses primarily on the labor
market and this offers a unique political opening to push for measures to improve the
performance of the low-wage labor market. Also, the immediacy of consumption deficits among
the poor continues to militate for the primacy of the income-based approach.
This does not imply a secondary role for asset building—it just states that you need to put out the
fire before you start building the new house. Which raises the point that for IDA’s to realize
their stated goals, they will need to be more generous. This suggests a bold redistributive
agenda, one which is worth supporting, but one which will engender strong political opposition
from conservative forces. Thus, progressives cannot simply accept market outcomes and
dedicate ourselves to repairing the damage in the secondary distribution. We need also to alter
the power dynamics of the current economy so that the fruits of economic growth are more fairly
divided.
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Table 1 The Impact of Demographic and Education Changes on Family Poverty Rates
1969-79 1979-89 1989-98

1969-98

Actual Change

-0.5

1.2

-0.1

0.5

Total Demographic Effect

0.5

-0.3

-0.4

-0.2

Race

0.3

0.4

0.3

1.0

Education

-1.6

-1.2

-1.0

-3.9

Family Structure

1.9

0.7

0.5

3.1

Interaction

-0.2

-0.1

-0.1

-0.4

Economic Change

-1.0

1.4

0.3

0.8

Growth

-1.5

-1.3

-1.5

-4.3

Inequality

0.5

2.7

1.8

5.1

Source: Mishel et al, 2001.
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